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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian : 
of VICKIE L. COLLINS, an 
incompetent person, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : Case No. 981511-CA 
v. : 
UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL : Priority No. 15 
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES : 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Apellees. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Darlene Collins, the natural mother of Vickie Collins, a 
multi-disabled, adult resident of defendant Utah State 
Developmental Center (USDC), brings this appeal from an order of 
the Third Judicial District Court directing a verdict in favor of 
the state defendants on her medical malpractice claim. 
Jurisdiction over the claim lies within this Court under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) pursuant to a transfer from the 
Supreme Court of Utah (R. 215). 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that expert testimony 
was required to establish the standard of care governing the 
control of Vickie Collins1 recreational activities by USDC? 
The necessity for expert testimony in the case was 
explicitly raised in the memorandum supporting defendants1 motion 
in limine, which sought to exclude plaintiff's proposed expert as 
unqualified to testify on the standard of care applicable to each 
of the health care providers involved in the challenged decision. 
See R. 68-72 and 135-39. The trial judge ruled in favor of 
defendants on the issue orally from the bench during trial (Tr. 
293-95) and by subsequent written order granting defendants' 
motion for directed verdict (R. 166-171). 
Standard of Review: The facts underlying plaintiff's claim 
in this case are not disputed, and judgment was given for 
defendants on the legal ground that plaintiff's failure to 
present expert testimony on the applicable standard of care and 
the breach of that standard left two critical elements of the 
case unestablished (R. 169). Under supreme court precedent, "a 
directed verdict is appropriate if, on uncontested facts and 
under the applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment." 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). Such 
"[l]egal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded no 
deference." Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 
920 (Utah 1997); see also Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787 
P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1990) ("A trial court's conclusions of law 
are reviewed for correctness and are not given special 
deference"). 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding 
plaintiff's expert witness unqualified to testify as to the 
standard of care owed by USDC to Vickie Collins? 
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Defendants placed the testimonial competence of plaintiff's 
expert at issue in the memorandum accompanying their motion in 
limine. See R. 68-72, 135-39. The district court judge ruled 
for defendants on this issue orally from the bench during trial 
(Tr. 293-95) and by subsequent written order (R. 168-69). 
Standard of Review; "It is within the discretion of the 
trial court to determine whether a particular witness qualifies 
as an expert and to rule on the admissibility of the expert!s 
testimony." Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 906 
((Utah App. 1997). The appellate court therefore reviews the 
district court's determination for abuse of that discretion. Id. 
at 907. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court for decision 
is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Darlene Collins brought this action in February, 1996 
(R. 2), on behalf of her daughter Vickie Collins. Vickie is an 
adult woman with profound mental retardation who also suffers 
from schizophrenia (Aplt. App. 7) and has a history of seizures 
(Aplt. App. 9). Plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently 
allowed Vickie to use a standard swing for recreation despite 
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Vickie's known history of seizures which had caused unrelated 
injury in the past, and that, in consequence, Vickie fell from 
the swing and sustained an injury resulting in permanent 
paraplegia (R. 2-5). At the time of the accident, Vickie did not 
have a legal guardian (Aplt. App. 7). Defendants answered, 
denying liability (R. 14-21), and the case proceeded toward 
trial. In May of 1998, defendants filed a motion in limine 
(R. 64-66), with a supporting memorandum (R. 67-75), seeking to 
exclude the testimony of plaintiff's designated expert witness, 
Lewis Mustard, as to the standard of care owed to Vickie by her 
health care providers at USDC. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion 
(R. 79-80) and memorandum (R. 81-112) which, among other things, 
opposed exclusion of Mustard as unqualified to testify 
(R. 82-84). 
During a recess early in the trial, the district court 
judge, outside the hearing of the jury, preliminarily sustained 
defendants' objections to Mustard's qualifications (Tr. 21), but 
agreed to give plaintiff an opportunity to establish additional 
qualifying foundation later in the day (Tr. 22-24). Plaintiff's 
attempt was unsuccessful, and Mustard's testimony was precluded 
(Tr. 274-95). At the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the 
court reconvened while the jury was in recess, and defendants 
moved for a directed verdict, which was orally granted from the 
bench (Tr. 330-37) and later reduced to writing (R. 166-71). 
This appeal followed (R. 193-94). 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took 
place, Vickie Collins was a 40-year-old resident of the Utah 
State Developmental Center, to which she had first been admitted 
in 1958 (Aplt. App. at 7). Withdrawn from USDC a year later, she 
returned full-time in 1966 and has resided there continuously 
since her return under a dual diagnosis of severe mental 
retardation and schizophrenia (id.). She also has a history of 
sporadic seizure activity (id. at 17). 
Swinging has been one of Vickiefs favorite activities since 
she became a full-time USDC resident, according to plaintiff (Tr. 
143), something she would do every chance she could get from the 
time she was a little girl (Tr. 144). In fact, plaintiff stated 
on direct examination by her counsel that at times, she had taken 
Vickie out to swing on the swings located outside the Raintree 
building where Vickie was housed1--the very swings on which she 
was ultimately injured--and acknowledged that Vickie had enjoyed 
engaging in swinging for years (Tr. 101-02). Vickie had used the 
swings for some 28 years without incident before the accident 
that forms the basis of this case. 
x0n cross-examination, plaintiff denied ever having used the 
USDC swings: 
Q: And when you would visit [Vickie] before the 
accident at the Center, you would sometimes take her 
out to the swings at the Center to swing? 
A: No. 
Q: You never used the swings at the Center? 
A: No. 
Tr. 144. Plaintiff, did, however, acknowledge taking Vickie to 
the local park, where she would play on the regular playground 
swings like those she used at the Center (see Tr. 144-45). 
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Plaintiff was well aware of Vickie's seizures, beginning 
with the petit mal seizures Vickie had as a child (Tr. 90) and 
progressing to seizures of greater intensity at puberty (Tr, 91). 
Plaintiff personally witnessed some of these seizures (Tr. 
91-92). She testified that USDC staff would tell her about 
Vickie's seizure activity when she would visit Vickie at the 
Center (Tr. 90) and noted that Vickie's swinging had been 
restricted due to seizures at one time during the late 1960s (Tr. 
136). She did not recall any other occasions when Vickie's 
seizures led to a restriction on swinging (Tr. 97). She also 
noted that at one time a number of years before the accident, 
Vickie had been placed in a helmet (Tr. 93) for her own 
protection (Tr. 99); in fact, plaintiff herself had provided the 
helmet (Tr. 97-98) . 
Near the time of the accident, Vickie had once again been 
placed in a protective helmet after sustaining head injuries when 
she fell during a seizure on December 9, 1993, and hit her head 
on a filing cabinet (Aplt. Brf. at 15, % 20). According to her 
testimony, plaintiff had no objection to the use of the helmet 
even though the decision to use it was not discussed with her in 
advance (Tr. 98-99). Plaintiff further testified that she had no 
concerns about Vickie's safety at the Center in light of Vickie's 
seizures. As she stated, 
[Vickie] had lived there for a long time. They had a 
helmet on her before for her own protection and I knew 
that I was her mother and that I had turned my 
motherhoodship over to the school and that I felt that 
they would be responsible for her safety. 
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(Tr. 99). She also admitted that Vickie had previously been 
injured at the Center in a seizure-related fall in which she lost 
some of her teeth, but did not hold USDC responsible because 
prevention would have required Vickie to be strapped into a chair 
in violation of her rights (Tr. 146-47). 
Decisions about Vickie's care and activities were made by an 
interdisciplinary team of professionals, including a qualified 
mental retardation professional (QMRP), a social worker, a nurse, 
a recreational therapist, and direct care staff (Tr. 290-91). 
Each year, the treatment team conducted a staffing and completed 
a comprehensive individual habilitation plan (IHP) reviewing all 
facets of Vickie's institutional care and establishing treatment 
objectives and methodologies for the coming year (Aplt. App. 
7-20; Tr. 130-34). Plaintiff acknowledged that when she was 
present at the annual staffing of Vickie's case most closely 
preceding the accident, she did not ask the staff to prevent 
Vickie from swinging, even though she was aware of Vickie's 
increased seizure activity during the prior few months (Tr. 135), 
nor did she raise the issue with Vickie's neurologist (Tr. 
135-36). 
On March 9, 1994, Vickie and seven other residents of the 
Raintree building were taken outside to play under the 
supervision of two staff members. Vickie, wearing her helmet, 
immediately went to the swings and began swinging (Aplt. Brf. at 
18, %% 32-33; Tr. 246-47). A staff member testified that she was 
within 10 to 15 feet of Vickie, with Vickie in her peripheral 
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vision, while kicking a ball to another resident (Tr. 253-54) . 
Within three or four minutes, the staff member heard a thump and 
saw Vickie lying on the ground (Tr. 24 8). As a result of the 
fall, Vickie sustained a high-impact burst of the T-7 vertebra 
which resulted in her paralysis (Tr. 165-66). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff claims that her case sounds in simple negligence, 
not medical malpractice, and that consequently, she is not 
required to present expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care owed to Vickie Collins by defendant health care provider 
Utah State Developmental Center. In the alternative, plaintiff 
claims that even if the case is deemed a medical malpractice 
action, she is exempt from the requirement to present expert 
testimony on the standard of care because the cause of Vickie1s 
injury is within the common knowledge and experience of the lay 
juror. She also argues that because she has sued only the 
facility, not individual staff members, no professional standards 
of care are relevant. In effect, having invoked the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act as the basis for her complaint, plaintiff 
now seeks to disavow its strictures and change the legal theory 
of her case on appeal to "facility negligence" (see Aplt. Brf. at 
24, n.l), a term unknown in published Utah case law, in direct 
contradiction to her position below. Neither the content of her 
pleadings nor the uncontested record facts support such a change. 
As plaintiff failed to bring herself within the exceptions to the 
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necessity for expert testimony on the applicable standard of care 
in her medical malpractice action, the district court correctly 
concluded that she had likewise failed to establish the elements 
of her claim, warranting a directed verdict for defendants. 
Because the district court did not misapply the law in 
requiring expert testimony, it was within the court's discretion 
to determine whether plaintiff's proposed expert witness was 
qualified to testify as to the relevant standard of care. As the 
record reflects, the court carefully considered the nature of the 
proposed expert's credentials and experience. Plaintiff does not 
contest the court's factual findings, which provide a rational 
basis for its decision to exclude the testimony. Since the 
court's determination does not exceed the limits of 
reasonability, it is entitled to affirmance on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT AVOID THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY BY CHANGING THE LEGAL THEORY OF HER 
CASE ON APPEAL. 
From the inception of her action against defendants, 
plaintiff has relied on a medical malpractice theory under the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 
through -16 (1996), as the basis for her claim. Her complaint 
states that she served notice of intent to commence action under 
section 78-14-8 (1996), which prohibits action against a health 
care provider absent notice under the act (R. 3, % 7). The 
complaint further asserts that the Division of Occupational and 
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Professional Licensing certified plaintiff's compliance with all 
the requirements of section 78-14-12 (1996), which establishes 
the procedural requisites of a prelitigation hearing under the 
act (R. 3, % 8). At no time in the case below did plaintiff 
repudiate her reliance on the act. 
Plaintiff wrongly asserts that any tort committed by a 
health care provider is deemed a medical malpractice action under 
the act. Her truncated citation to the act's definition of a 
medical malpractice action (see Aplt. Brf. at 26, n.3) neglects 
to include the statutory language that links the alleged tort to 
the provision of health care. Under the definitions contained in 
section 78-14-3, 
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" 
means any action against a health care provider, 
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1998)2 (emphasis added). 
Subsection (11), in turn, states that 
"Health care provider" includes any person, 
partnership, association, corporation, or other 
facility or institution who causes to be rendered or 
who renders health care or professional services as a 
hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental 
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory 
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric 
physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, 
naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-
language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified 
2The 1998 amendment to section 78-14-3 did not affect the 
language of subsection (14). 
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social worker, social service worker, marriage and 
family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others 
rendering similar care and services relating to or 
arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of 
the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1998)3 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has never contended that the Utah State Developmental 
Center is not a health care provider under the actfs expansive 
definition or that it did not render or cause to be rendered 
professional services relating to or arising out of Vickie's 
health needs and provided by its employees or agents. Nothing in 
plaintiff's brief on appeal addresses the applicability of these 
statutory definitions that bring her cause of action within the 
scope of the act's coverage. 
The uncontested facts do, however, amply demonstrate the 
act's applicability. As plaintiff herself points out, USDC "had 
a limited guardianship over [Vickie] Collins for the purpose of 
providing her with medical treatment" (Aplt. Brf. at 13, % 9) and 
"provided Collins with comprehensive care for her individual 
needs" (id. at 13, % 8) through the use of Individualized 
Habilitation Plans (IHPs) which "took into account each 
resident's individualized needs, abilities, and limitations" (id. 
at'13, 1 11) in determining "specific treatment objectives and 
plans for residents1 medical, recreational, social, dietary, and 
other needs" (id.). In other words, Vickie's comprehensive, 
3The 1998 amendment to section 78-14-3 did not affect the 
language of subsection (11). 
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multiple disabilities required equally comprehensive treatment 
that extended to all areas of her life and was provided by Center 
personnel--employees or agents of USDC acting in the course and 
scope of their employment. Because plaintiff claims that this 
comprehensive care was negligently rendered, her action sounds in 
health care malpractice, as the district court correctly 
determined: "While this is not a classic medical malpractice 
action as such, it does, it clearly involves the providing of 
health care services which is [sic] specialized in nature and 
beyond the realm of common lay knowledge" (Tr. 337). In light of 
the record facts, plaintiff's contention that her claim is for 
simple negligence, not professional malpractice, is untenable. 
It is firmly established in Utah law that proof of medical 
malpractice requires expert testimony as to the standard of care 
and its breach. As this Court has stated, 
In medical malpractice actions the plaintiff must 
provide expert testimony to establish: 1) the standard 
of care; 2) defendant's failure to comply with that 
standard; and 3) that defendant caused plaintiff's 
injuries. Further, issues of fact which are outside 
the knowledge and experience of lay persons must be 
established by expert testimony. 
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 
App. 1987); see also Burton v. Youncrblood. 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 
(Utah 1985); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); 
Kent v. Pioneer Vallev Hosp.. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997); 
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah App. 1994); Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988); Martin v. Mott. 744 
P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App. 1987). Plaintiff cites to Nixdorf for 
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the proposition that under certain circumstances, expert 
testimony is unnecessary. In Nixdorf, a physician left a needle 
in the plaintiff!s abdomen during surgery. The trial court 
directed a verdict for defendants on the basis that plaintiff had 
failed to introduce expert testimony on the applicable standard 
of care. The supreme court reversed, applying a res ipsa 
loquitur theory as an exception to the general rule. Plaintiff 
seeks the same result here. 
However, the Nixdorf exception cannot be stretched so far. 
This Court explained Nixdorf's limited reach in Chadwick as 
follows: 
The Nixdorf exception can be fully understood only in 
light of its facts. The doctor in Nixdorf lost a 
cutting needle inside his patient's body and then 
failed to disclose this fact. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that jurors could determine the standard of care 
the doctor was required to follow without expert 
medical testimony because it is common knowledge that 
reasonable medical practitioners do not leave surgical 
instruments inside their patients' bodies and then keep 
it a secret. The Court noted that expert testimony 
would shed little light on the "propriety of the 
treatment" the Nixdorf plaintiff received. 612 P.2d at 
352-53. 
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821-22. The facts in Nixdorf fulfill the 
purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as explained by the 
supreme court: 
to permit one who suffers injury from something under 
the control of another, which ordinarily would not 
cause the injury except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or jury on the basis 
of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such 
facts, even though he may be unable to present direct 
evidence of the other's negligence. 
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Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 348 P.2d 935, 936 
(Utah 1960). In Joseph, the court held the doctrine inapplicable 
to an incompatible blood transfusion reaction, noting that "there 
can be no certainty that there will be no adverse blood reaction 
even when the best methods known to medical science are used in 
the typing and matching of the blood." Joseph, 348 P.2d at 938. 
Because certainty of causation may be lacking, the court applies 
the doctrine "only with caution, particularly in the medical 
field because of the realization that many aspects of the 
treatment of human ills cannot yet be regarded as exact science 
and a bad result may obtain even though recognized standards of 
care and skill are employed." Id. The court rejected 
plaintiff's appeal for this reason. 
As in Joseph, the facts in plaintiff's case do not warrant 
the application of a res ipsa loquitur theory--the basis of the 
Nixdorf exception--to overcome the need for expert testimony. 
The swing on which Vickie was injured was not in defendants1 
exclusive control. A fall from a swing and resulting injury 
could have occurred by accident and without defendants1 
negligence. Given the complexity of factors--severe mental 
retardation, schizophrenia, and a controlled seizure 
disorder--that faced the interdisciplinary health care team in 
making recommendations for Vickie's activities, its choices are 
beyond the knowledge and experience of lay jurors, and could be 
adequately explained only through the testimony of one or more 
experts familiar with the standards of care to be met by the team 
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members. The district court's decision to require expert 
testimony was fully compliant with legal precedent, and plaintiff 
has given no reason to disturb it. 
plaintiff attempts to excuse her neglect to provide expert 
testimony by blaming the trial court for fffail[ing] to identify 
which particular health care service(s) were at issue" (Aplt. 
Brf. at 29). Plaintiff misapprehends her burden to go forward. 
The court need not produce a blueprint for her legal education; 
it is her initiative to proceed by establishing the elements of 
her case in accordance with statute and precedent, and her burden 
on appeal to show the lower court's decision to be flawed. Doing 
neither, her cause must fail. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO 
REJECT PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED EXPERT AS UNQUALIFIED TO 
TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE DEFENDANTS OWED TO 
VICKIE. 
Because the trial court did not misapply the law in 
requiring expert testimony, it had discretion to determine 
whether plaintiff's proposed expert was qualified to testify as 
to the standard of care defendants owed to Vickie; fl[i3t is 
within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a 
particular witness qualifies as an expert and to rule on the 
admissibility of the expertfs testimony." Kent, 930 P*2d at 906. 
Plaintiff's argument that her expert was qualified to testify 
depends on her characterization of the case as one asserting 
negligence by a facility rather than malpractice by a health care 
provider. See Aplt. Brf. at 44 n.13. She asserts that 
defendants1 actions "put at issue the Center's risk management 
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principles that were in place to protect its residents" (Aplt. 
Brf. at 44). 
As the trial court found, Lewis Mustard is "certainly an 
eminently [qualified] man in his own area of expertise, 
specifically the hospital management. But I am not persuaded 
that he presents the appropriate credentials for opining 
regarding the negligence or lack thereof of the facility in 
question here incident to what is being tried" (Tr. 293-94). The 
court explained: 
He has, by his candor and his testimony, and his 
curriculum vitae, acknowledge[d] that he has no formal 
schooling in patient care, that his management health 
care facilities experience has been by and large in 
institutions, dealing with institutions that did not 
have as their additional burden dealing with those 
people who are severely handicapped or developmentally 
disabled or mentally retarded. He has not rendered 
treatment to mentally disabled people, he has not been 
on the front line of making decisions regarding safety 
of those individuals, in particular, as it relates to 
recreation. He has testified that he is not familiar 
with the standard of care at an ICFMR [Intermediate 
Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded], which is what 
we are dealing with here, in particular with patients 
who have signs of seizure in their use of swing sets, 
and for that matter, other recreational facilities. 
He is not, by his candid testimony, a qualified 
mental retardation professional. He is not a licensed 
professional in any field. He has no recollection of 
when he last visited or observed activities in an 
ICFMR. He has reviewed no other facilities [sic] 
policies incident to the issue we're faced with here 
today, he has so testified. And he is not familiar 
with policies outside of what we're concerned with in 
this particular case, that is, policies of other 
facilities. 
Tr. 294-95. Finding a significant distinction between Mustard's 
risk management experience and the provision of direct health 
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care services, the court sustained defendants1 objection to 
Mustard's testimony (Tr. 295). 
Rather than showing error in the district court's findings, 
plaintiff simply recycles the arguments she made below. She does 
not deny that Mustard lacked direct patient care experience or 
certification in any of the specialties represented on Vickie's 
IHP team. While she insists that "Dr. Mustard's broad experience 
and numerous credentials qualified him to testify as an expert" 
(Aplt. Brf. at 45), she neglects to acknowledge that any expert 
is limited to testifying in the area of his expertise. The 
question she fails to answer is how Mustard's particular 
experience and credentials demonstrate a standard of care that is 
shared with that of Vickie's caregivers, the individuals whose 
actions are at issue in this case. 
Burton v. Youngblood is instructive on this point. 
Youngblood, a general plastic surgeon, performed an upper eyelid 
blepharoplasty on Burton which resulted in ptosis, or eyelid 
droop. After Youngblood was unable to correct the problem, 
Burton sought the assistance of other plastic surgeons and an 
opthalmologist, Dr. Jackson; she also filed suit against 
Youngblood, using Jackson to testify to the requisite standard of 
care. The case was dismissed at the close of Burton's case-in-
chief on the ground that she had failed to establish the standard 
of care or its violation by Youngblood. On appeal, Burton argued 
that Jackson was qualified to testify as to the standard of care 
because both Jackson and Youngblood performed the same surgical 
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procedure, even though their respective specialties were 
different. The court disagreed, implementing the general rule 
that "ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is not 
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against 
a practitioner of another school." Burton. 711 P.2d at 248. It 
acknowledged an exception to the rule "once sufficient foundation 
has been laid to show that the method of treatment--and hence the 
standard of care--is common to both schools" (id.), but found 
that the foundational requirement had not been met.4 
Likewise, in plaintiff's case, there has been no 
foundational showing of a common standard of care between Mustard 
and defendants. Moreover, the discrepancy between Mustard's 
expertise and that of Vickie's health care providers is much 
greater than the distinction in Burton. Defendants and Mustard 
do not perform the same activities with respect to individual 
patients. Mustard has no experience or certification in 
therapeutic decisionmaking, the essence of the health care 
providers' responsibilities. He works on an institutional, not a 
personal, level. While he is charged with protecting 
institutions against unnecessary risk, defendants are charged 
with maximizing Vickie's abilities and lifestyle choices. 
Plaintiff's case is more nearly akin to Chadwick v. Nielsen. 
Nielsen performed vascular surgery to relieve pain in Chadwick's 
leg, but the pain persisted after the operation, leading to a 
4The Supreme Court of Utah recently reaffirmed the validity 
of the Burton test in Boice v. Marble, 366 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 
(Utah 1999) . 
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medical malpractice action some five years later. This Court 
held that because "the standard of care applicable to a vascular 
surgeon in the removal of veins is not within the common 
knowledge and experience of laypersons" (Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 
822), it must be established by expert testimony. The Court 
rejected Chadwick1s attempt to fulfill this requirement with the 
testimony of her father, an electrical engineer with expertise in 
fluid mechanics, observing that "[t]o adopt Chadwick1s position, 
although its creativity is acknowledged, would allow geologists 
to give expert testimony as to the appropriate principles to be 
employed in the extraction of gallstones. We think such a result 
would not enhance justice in medical malpractice cases." Id. 
The trial court's decision to preclude Mustard's expert 
testimony in this case does not exceed the limits of 
reasonability and does not constitute reversible error. As the 
Court remarked in Dikeou, 
In exercising [its] discretion, we believe a trial 
court should require a medical expert witness to 
demonstrate familiarity with the applicable standard of 
care based on more than just a review of the documents 
in the particular case. By definition, an expert is 
one who possesses a significant depth and breadth of 
knowledge on a given subject. To allow a doctor in one 
specialty, retained as an expert witness, to become an 
"expert" on the standard of care in a different medical 
specialty by merely reading and studying the documents 
in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial 
fraught with unreliable testimony. 
Dikeou, 881 P.2d at 947. Mustard's proposed testimony was based 
not on day-to-day, hands-on experience of the kind rendered by 
defendants and their employees, but on remote assessment of 
institutional, not individual, risks, employing criteria other 
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than the balancing of a particular residentfs personal needs and 
capabilities. Because no foundational testimony established that 
the methods of analysis he employed in determining institutional 
risk were the same methods used by Vickie's health care providers 
to select appropriate recreational opportunities for her, the 
court was within its discretion to preclude Mustard's testimony 
as to the standard of care applicable to them. Plaintiff's 
failure to identify record evidence showing a shared standard of 
care leaves this Court without grounds for reversal, and the 
trial court's decision must consequently be affirmed. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S "SPECIAL DUTY" ARGUMENT MUST BE 
REJECTED BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff argues that USDC 
stood in a special relationship to Vickie, conferring an 
affirmative duty on defendants to protect her from harm (see 
Aplt. Brf. at 30-33). This theory was not raised or addressed in 
the court below. It is this Court's established practice not to 
consider such issues on review; in the Court's words, "It is well 
settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances or plain error, 
issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." US 
Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 
(Utah 1994) ("As a general rule, we will review issues raised for 
the first time on appeal only if exceptional circumstances or 
'plain error' exists"). Plaintiff has identified no exceptional 
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circumstances or plain error that would justify the Court's 
attention to her tardily raised theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Having brought her case under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, plaintiff should not now be heard to assert that 
no professional malpractice was involved. Because the action 
correctly sounds in medical malpractice as defined by statute, 
plaintiff was required to establish the standard of care by 
expert testimony. The trial court's rejection of plaintiff's 
proposed expert witness is supported by the evidence of record 
and within the limits of reasonability. For these reasons, the 
directed verdict in favor of defendants is entitled to 
affirmance, as more fully explained above. Therefore, defendants 
respectfully request this Court to affirm the decision of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendants believe the law is sufficiently established as to 
the issues in this case that a decision can be rendered without 
oral argument. However, in the event that oral argument is 
ordered by the Court, defendants wish to participate. Defendants 
do believe that the facts of the case would make a published 
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opinion helpful as a guide for further litigation in the 
sensitive areas of medical malpractice and patient rights. 
M Dated this cMM day of April, 1999. 
NANCY L. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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